Let’s begin with your personal and political background. Could you tell us about your early influences?

Timo Juhani Soini: I joined the Finnish Rural Party at the age of 16 in 1979. The party was originally founded by Karelian immigrants who had to move to mainland Finland when the Soviet Union forcibly displaced around 400,000 people during World War II. The environment I grew up in was strongly critical of communism. I entered university in the autumn of 1981, the same year President Urho Kekkonen stepped down after decades in power. At the university, there was solid support for the Polish Solidarity movement, and I participated in demonstrations, especially around the time martial law was declared in Poland. John Paul II was and remains an important role model for me. In fact, I converted to Catholicism in 1988.

At the university I was very active on international level, visiting for example United States in 1985 which was Reagan’s era. That was a rare opportunity for me as a young Finnish politician. I was also interested in UK politics and visited UK on various occasions. I was Western oriented very early on.

How would you describe the security situation in the Baltic Sea region during the Cold War?

During Soviet times, the region was relatively stable, albeit due to necessity or fear. Finland and Sweden remained non-aligned and considered themselves neutral. The collapse of socialism became visible after Chernobyl, although many elites refused to accept it. Still, the systemic collapse that followed was relatively bloodless, which remains a blessing. Borders were strictly supervised and although security situation was stable, it was more because of the necessity and not because people believed in the system and for the change. People really didn’t believe that the systems can be challenged from the outside, because nobody wanted a war-like situation on any level. That is why although it was clear that there were systematic problems in socialism nobody really believed that any kind of a political revolution could happen because of the security authorities and the army. However, miracle did happen from the inside and system killed itself.

How did Finland’s approach to Russia evolve after the Cold War?

Finnish attitudes towards Russia have always been divided – between those favoring a tougher stance and those preferring cooperation. Both sought the best for Finland. These perspectives persisted until our accession to NATO, which marked a radical shift. Now, all our eggs are in the same basket.

It was walking on the tight rope; it wasn’t always easy. Everybody knew that the boat is leaking, but this was real politics at the time.

Early in your political career, you were known for your Euroscepticism. Internationally, you were considered a critic of the EU’s bailout mechanisms, and the Finnish Rural Party, founded in the 1950s to represent the interests of farmers and the rural population, eventually evolved into a more right-wing populist movement. In 1995, it was succeeded by the modern Finns’ Party (Perussuomalaiset), which holds a strongly Eurosceptic and anti-immigration stance. When did your attitude toward the European Union and NATO change, and what were the reasons?

NATO was never a problem for me. And for very long time I was dreaming about the Norwegian model, inside the NATO but outside of the European Union. The main reason was my fear of losing national sovereignty and I was worried that European Union’s common agricultural politics would kill small family farms, and our remote areas would suffer.

What role did you play in Finland’s NATO journey?

I was Finland’s Foreign Minister from 2015 to 2019. I commissioned a NATO report in 2016, but it did not initiate the accession process. Back then, most Finns and Swedes preferred staying outside the Alliance. Finland pursued a policy of active stability, aiming to safeguard our national interests, although this couldn’t influence Russia’s behavior. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 changed everything.

I was very active on the international level, visiting US, UK and other NATO countries, including Turkey several times and clearly told that Finland would be an asset, not a problem for NATO.

Finland has a conscription army which means that we have hundreds of thousands of men trained and they form a reliable and solid reserve force.

How did the invasion of Ukraine affect Finnish public opinion?

It reminded us of 1939 when Finland stood alone against Soviet aggression. That trauma has not been forgotten. This time, the people decisively wanted NATO membership, and political leaders followed swiftly. Thankfully, the road had been open for years.

It was a revolution in people’s minds and politicians had to follow the public opinion, not vice versa.

Was NATO membership difficult to achieve for Finland and Sweden?

Finland’s path was relatively smooth, but Sweden faced opposition from Turkey and Hungary. Still, Poland and the Baltic States supported both of us steadfastly, and we’re very grateful for that. Turkey and Hungary resisted Sweden for domestic reasons, it had not much to do with the NATO membership itself. We as Finland did not have that type of an issue.

What’s your view on European defence efforts within the EU?

There’s frustration in Finland about always having to support financially weaker EU members, particularly in the South of Europe. Similar negligence is seen in defence spending. Countries further from Russia often fail to take threats seriously.

That is really a problem that we have been too weak, both what comes to a political will and readiness to increase military spending. That is changing, but too slowly.

Timo Juhani Soini . fot. archiwum Autora

How should Europe respond to growing threats from Russia?

We need to convince the US that we are relevant and complement each other. Without the US, there are no real security guarantees. This means acting responsibly and speaking clearly in bilateral and multilateral forums. Europe alone is not enough, although it must be strengthened quickly. Poland has a key role to play, and its significance goes beyond its own borders.

The key element is unity. We cannot tolerate free riders inside the European Union and NATO. We must be extremely tough in this matter.

What should be done in the Baltic Sea region specifically?

There’s a need for a coherent maritime strategy. Russian ships operate with near-impunity in the region, sanctions are being bypassed, and St. Petersburg remains a psychological and strategic focal point for Putin. NATO has plans, of course, but much more needs to be done to control these waters.

This is a topical and current issue as we have now noticed. Russia is rocking, literally rocking the boat in our home sea. All the Baltic Sea countries must be active, and we must keep the area high on NATO agenda.

What’s your take on the Nordic-Baltic cooperation framework?

The Nordic-Baltic Eight Group (NB8) is very active, and with Finland and Sweden in NATO, we are now linked more closely with both the Baltic and Nordic groups. This dual alignment strengthens regional security. It’s a positive change.

How do you interpret Russia’s broader geopolitical mindset?

Russia does not accept the sovereignty of small countries. In their mindset, only great powers have the right to define the rules. International law matters little to them. Their economy serves ideological ends. As long as you don’t challenge power, making money is fine.

What should the European Countries understand when engaging with the US?

The US won’t protect us out of sentiment. We need to be useful to them. “America first but not alone” is the best scenario. Unity among the Baltic countries is essential, as Russia always probes the weakest link.

We must be constantly active and productive, telling that we are an asset which could and should be used and make US to understand that showing weakness at any part of the NATO is damaging the whole credibility of our military alliance.

You once said that Finland “is not afraid of anyone”. What did you mean by that?

That was from an interview with Kommersant. I emphasized that Finland does not view Russia as an immediate threat, but we do support sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine. Our position is guided by independence, confidence, and strategic clarity.

Smart choice is to cooperate and work with us rather than create tension. We are nation who does not want to be dictated and is impossible to be occupied.

In 2017, you proposed creating a “hybrid threat ambassador”. What was your rationale?

I proposed the idea of a hybrid threat ambassador to coordinate Finland’s efforts against cyber threats and disinformation. This complemented existing work, like the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki.

What was your position on NATO before Finland joined?

I always supported close cooperation with NATO. In 2016, I stated Finland could join NATO, but didn’t have to – keeping the option open. I believed that participation in joint exercises and regular dialogue provided stability in the Baltic Sea region.

How did you view the role of the United States in Baltic security?

I consistently said that the U.S. presence in the Baltic Sea region has a stabilizing effect. American commitment is key to maintaining security and balance in Europe. This is true regardless of who occupies the White House.

Besides Russia, did you identify other threats to Finnish or European security?

Yes. Migration and terrorism are also significant threats. I warned that uncontrolled migration could be exploited by terrorist networks. These risks require coordinated European responses.

The Arctic is increasing in importance. It is vital that European Union and NATO pay more attention and adds more pace at the Arctic what comes to climate issues, defense and security, communication and maritime safety.

How did you assess the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea?

After Crimea, Russia increased its military activity. I advocated for stronger cooperation with NATO and the EU, while maintaining high national readiness. The Baltic Sea is not just a regional but a strategic theater for Europe and NATO.

Baltic Sea is our home sea, and whatever happens at the Baltic Sea will heavily affect countries around it.

To conclude, what values should guide European defence and unity?

There’s no society without values. Democracy from Greece, justice from Rome, and faith from Jerusalem – these are our roots. Without them, there is no growth, success, or defence worth having.

We need to trust our citizens and keep everyone in the society on board, that guarantees that they are interested in the common good, which is pivotal to our democracy.

Timo Juhani Soini (born 30 May 1962)

a Finnish politician, co-founder and long-time leader of the Finns Party. He served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland from 2015 to 2019. Earlier, he was a Member of the European Parliament (2009–2011) and later served multiple terms in the Finnish Parliament. Known for his euroscepticism and critical stance towards EU bailouts, he played a key role in shaping Finnish politics in the 2000s and 2010s. A devout Catholic, he retired from active politics in 2019.