Let’s start with the fact that, after many months of the bill being blocked in Congress in the U.S., aid for Ukraine worth over $60 billion has finally been approved. Will this change its extremely difficult situation?

General Waldemar Skrzypczak: Ukraine is counting on fast deliveries, which have already started. The Americans had collected some of the equipment earlier in anticipation of Congress agreeing to pass the Ukraine aid bill. These aren’t systems that were forwarded to U.S. plants as part of the $6 billion aid package to be produced in the future. This is already happening. The ammunition that soldiers need so badly is already reaching Ukraine. What will this change? It will improve the Ukrainian army’s defence capabilities. We shouldn’t expect the Ukrainians to suddenly switch into the offensive as a result because, for the time being, they do not even have the people to conduct such action.

The Russians have an advantage over the Ukrainian army, which no longer has any reserves. It’s difficult to imagine someone who doesn’t have an advantage conducting offensive strikes. However, the Ukrainian defence capabilities are certainly improving and they will be able to repel the attacks of the Russian army more effectively, exhausting the potential of the oncoming Russian offensive troops. All the more so that the Ukrainians have prepared a good defence in the forests and hills in the northern part of Donbas, on the routes to Kup’yans’k, Lymans’ke and Svatove. The Russians won’t have an easy time there. They have also fortified the cities, preparing them for defence all round. They have connected them with defensive positions outside the cities, protecting them with systems of engineering dams and minefields, with which, despite Russia’s advantage, they can effectively conduct a defence.

Commentators say that, in fact, adding money will not be much help for Ukraine. This is because they have command problems; they don’t have the advantage of drones and, despite being very old, Russia is using a huge amount of equipment. Additionally, the Russians have replenished their forces, which Ukraine has not yet managed to do, because they were late introducing a mobilization law.

In addition to problems with aid from the West, the Ukrainians also have a personnel problem. They don’t have the human potential on the basis of which they could call up so many reservists to replenish the military units. Therefore, the main problem of the Ukrainian army is the inability to replenish their reserves.

Even if we were to allocate millions for ammunition and the purchase of thousands of tanks, if Ukraine no longer has an army, no one to fight, it will be unable to stop the Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians must now make efforts to form the additional units they need on the front through mobilization and the introduction of conscription.

But, as it transpires, without air defence against missiles and drones, even the most state-of-the-art weapons obtained by Ukraine, such as U.S. Abrams tanks or German Leopards, are being destroyed by drones that cost incomparably less.

The Russians are intensely hunting and will continue to hunt for Leopard and Abrams tanks, just as they will hunt for other systems that Ukraine has received or is due to receive, such as ATACMS tactical missile systems. Air defence is key for Ukraine. They need Patriots, NASAMS air defence systems and many others, including anti-drone systems, to protect the troops fighting in defensive positions, to defend critical infrastructure and airports. For a year now, since information appeared about the transfer of Western aircraft to Ukraine, the Russians have been intensively bombarding the whole of the airport structure. Where the F-16s will be stationed is unknown. Ukraine also has a problem with this, because all the airports, which the Russians are systematically attacking, are practically destroyed.

Some are also forecasting that the war with the Russian aggressor will be prolonged. It may even last for years.

I believe it can be clearly seen that if there are no decisions this year to end the war, it could last a long time. However, the West, including the U.S., is aware that human resources are being depleted. Therefore, talk about a long war is groundless because the Ukrainians will not have the people to fight it.

Despite the determination and courage of the Ukrainian soldiers at the front, many people are evading military service. Those who left are not returning to Ukraine, so I don’t see any chance at the moment of the Ukrainians being able to rebuild their army sufficiently to fight a long-term war.

Even if they get U.S. aid?

Precisely. That won’t change anything, because someone has to use these weapons. If there aren’t any soldiers, who will do it?

It is common knowledge that every war ends at politicians’ desks. But, in such a difficult situation as Ukraine’s, peace would mean Ukraine’s unfavourable territorial concessions to Russia. Is there any chance that the Russians will return the occupied territories?

No. I don’t believe the Russians will give up these areas. Ukraine may only keep the areas from the Dnipro to the west. It is simply unable to retake the territories seized by Russia because it does not have the potential. The Russians have the advantage.

If the Ukrainians wanted to liberate their territories, they would have to have a military advantage over the Russian army. There is no point dreaming that the Ukrainians will regain the territories they have lost so far, especially since the Russians have several belts of highly developed and fortified defences there.

Now, the only question left is when and who will agree to make peace and hand over the occupied eastern Ukrainian territories to the Russians. Ukraine really has no other option.

If the worst comes to the worst and Ukraine succumbs, what would Poland’s security look like? Will Russia really not stop in Ukraine, as many military specialists predict?

In my opinion, after this war, Putin will not have the military potential to start a fight with anyone for a long time. This is a fundamental issue for us. The Russians are currently talking about forming 14 new divisions and 16 brigades; this is their plan – assuming that the border with Ukraine will be ‘smouldering’ – up to 2035.

The Russians will be unable to restore their strength in the near future to a level with which they could confront NATO. All the more so that NATO not only has an advantage over Russia in all areas of operation of the armed forces, but it also has a technological advantage. Therefore, I believe we are entitled to feel unthreatened, but we need to build our armed forces to have an argument that will deter Putin from any fighting.

Does this mean that a conventional war between Russia and NATO is currently impossible?

In my opinion it’s impossible. Russia does not have the potential that would guarantee its victory in that war. All the more so that the Russian economy is not in a good condition at all; this war is costing the Russians a lot, and so fighting a stronger enemy and entering into a long-term war would destroy Russia.

It also arises from the news, including from the West, that the Russians are producing more ammunition than all NATO countries together; they still have thousands of old tanks in their warehouses, but what difference does it make if a soldier dies from a missile striking a new tank or an old tank? They are also continuing to mobilize recruits for their army all over the world. They are operating and it doesn’t look like it’s a crisis.

Europe is also currently mobilizing. It is starting to produce increasingly more ammunition and military equipment. It has understood that, if it doesn’t increase its arms production, it could be at risk. In my opinion, in 2–3 years, Europe will have restored the potential for producing ammunition and weapons, and armies will be much stronger than they are now.

So will we switch to semi-war mode in arms production?

This should be the case, at least in the military sector. However, a shift is primarily needed in industry from the communist mind-set to structural management, which will give an increase in production and cost reductions.

The capacity of the private arms industry for supplying all types of weapons that are currently most needed by the army also needs to be rebuilt immediately. This industry has huge capabilities, incomparably greater than many state-owned arms plants.

Let’s return to military aid for Ukraine. The European Union is looking for Patriot anti-missile systems for it. Poland has 16. Is this insufficient to transfer even some of them to Kyiv?

Firstly, we have nothing to transfer. Secondly, in my opinion, it is unreasonable for Poland to transfer air defence systems that have recently entered into service, because we are a frontline state and we have to have these systems, if only because we are a NATO outpost.

We are the first NATO country that has to be ready for what can happen across our eastern border. Therefore, we cannot deprive ourselves of such important capacity as air defence. But those countries further west in Europe, such as Germany and the Netherlands, can do so. The enemy will have to deal with us, before it reaches them and it will not have it easy.

As for air defence, it’s worth remembering the storm caused by the prime minister’s announcement of the construction of the ‘iron dome’, namely joining the European Sky Shield. Does this make sense? Some claim that we will stop developing our multi-layer Polish Shield.

We won’t lose anything. We still do not have a full air defence system; it is still being built and I believe it will be built. However, there is nothing stopping us from joining the European dome, knowing that, in the event of a threat, we will work together with our allies, and not in isolation.

Our anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems are compatible with NATO systems that other countries have, equally in terms of command, control, guidance and alerting, so I don’t see any conflict between Poland’s interests and what Europe is going to do.

We are far more advanced with air defence programmes than Europe. The European programme has not started yet, and we are building our capacity on the Wisła, Narew and Pilica multi-layered air defence programmes. But let’s also join the systems that Europe is going to build, because we have to think about collective defence in all areas – on land, at sea and in the air.

Poland is buying a thousand tanks, hundreds of self-propelled artillery vehicles, and artillery missile systems. Are these purchases necessary to strengthen our security in terms of building a strong anti-aircraft defence?

They are necessary. We have constantly had problems to date building our own tanks. Including with the Germans, who did not want to transfer their technology to us. The Leopard 2 modernization programme is the most expensive upgrade in the world. The Germans fleeced us as much as they could. What the Koreans are offering us is absolutely new in terms of our cooperation with anyone, because they are transferring their technologies to us. The greatest challenge now lies with the Polish politicians, not with the arms industry, because it is inefficient and managed in communist style.

Something has to finally be done about that. For example, we should ensure that, based on the technologies we can obtain from the Koreans, together with them, we can build and then develop a European tank production centre, as well as a European artillery production centre for the Polish version. We have a great deal of experience in doing this. The Romanians and Norwegians want to buy self-propelled howitzers from the Koreans, so why not produce these weapons together with the Koreans in Poland, employing a thousand Polish workers, who will therefore have jobs.

But in order to do this, the current parochial mind-set of some CEOs in the Polish defence sector, which is often absolutely ridiculous, needs to be changed. They have no vision of development for the future. They are only looking after their own particular interests. The most important thing for them is to bleed the Ministry of National Defence with high prices for what the army buys from Polish industry. This is the main problem of the Polish military sector.

Russian industry is modernizing old tanks that it is sending to the front. We could not modernize the Leopards for a long time, and we failed to modernize the PT-91 tank – not through the fault of the industry, but because of the politicians. Do we have any equipment that would be worth modernizing? Would it strengthen our defence potential?

We are unable to modernize equipment in Poland, among other things, because – as I have said – we have groups of particular interests which do not contribute much to the modernization of the army, but look after their own affairs. They are looking after themselves instead of considering the army’s needs.

One example of this is the fact that Poland buys the most expensive 155 mm calibre ammunition in the world. We don’t actually produce it, we just assemble it. We obtain all the components from abroad. Not only is the purchase of several thousand rounds of ammunition for 5 years a ridiculous contract, but it also means that a missile costs PLN 8,500, while such a missile costs PLN 4,000, or no more than PLN 4,500, globally.

The point is that the state should not be cheated. Either we are honest and politicians care about honesty in terms of spending taxpayers’ money, or we are all cheating ourselves and still being satisfied with that.

Building the autonomy of the Polish arms industry is another important challenge for the government. We have to build our own capacity. Become independent of foreigners for purchasing parts and subassemblies, and work on the basis of the domestic industry’s technologies in the public and private sectors.

Waldemar Skrzypczak

retired Lieutenant General of the Polish Armed Forces

Born on 19 January 1956 in Szczecin. Certified officer of the tank corps. He started his military service as an officer cadet in 1976. He commanded the 32nd Tank Regiment, the 16th Tank Division, the 11th Armoured Cavalry Division and the Multinational Division Central-South (MND-CS). He was the commander of the Polish Land Forces in 2006–2009. From 2011, he was an advisor to the Minister of National Defence and, in 2012–2013, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of National Defence.