As soon as President Andrzej Duda announced that we are prepared to join the NATO Nuclear Sharing programme of storing U.S. nuclear weapons in allied countries that do not have them and, if necessary, making these weapons available, a storm broke out. The head of NATO himself said that there are no such plans.

 General Stanisław Koziej: The Kremlin is systematically recalling the nuclear threat, because it is very effective scaremongering on their part with respect to public opinion in the West. This is always considered a real threat. This is part of the great information war that Russia has been waging for a long time against NATO and Europe.

Russia has been blackmailing the West with nuclear weapons for a long time, especially after its aggression on Ukraine. It seems as if this is having the desired effect in the propaganda war with the West, in which the nuclear arsenal is the most important argument. Does this mean we have no chance of becoming a beneficiary of this programme?

I consider Poland’s inclusion in this programme to be absolutely justified and correct. That is why we should consider such a possibility. Of course, this is a subject for detailed discussions. However, there is no doubt that Poland’s participation in this programme would be absolutely in the best interests of our security.

But it’s difficult to expect that Russia’s objection to the storage of nuclear weapons in Poland will disappear, at least in the near future. There’s no chance of that.

I don’t see that that is the problem. We don’t have to have nuclear weapons on our territory immediately. I believe this would be a simplification of our entire participation in Nuclear Sharing.

Bringing the discussion on this project down only to the matter of locating U.S. nuclear weapons on our territory, which should obviously be an option, is not an objective in itself. Looking at the approach of the U.S. to this issue, this is a matter to be considered last.

So what is left for us in this situation?

We should try to join this programme at all costs, try to barge our way into it, but in other forms, which are more acceptable to the U.S., which is the depository of these nuclear weapons, because after all, without their decision, discussions about this are pointless.

We should remember that NATO’s nuclear programme is not just limited to bombs. It’s much broader. It’s also platforms for delivering them, the construction of infrastructure, communication and communication systems, as well as training.

I believe we should start entering this programme in small steps. We should start with the smallest ones, but those that give the greatest chance of success in the future. This does not necessarily have to be an offer to locate nuclear weapons directly on our territory from the outset.

What can we offer U.S. to convince it that Poland should be included in this programme?

The first example that comes to mind is to offer that our aircraft have a dual-purpose role – including as a potential means of delivering nuclear weapons. Especially the F-35 planes that we are buying and we are due to receive the first of these in a month. They are prepared for carrying such weapons, just like the F-16.

An even softer part of our inclusion in the programme is the question of our air force providing cover for the flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. The participation of our air force, air defence systems and anti-missile defence systems in joint operations related to the use of nuclear weapons.

So what should Poland do to convince the U.S., but also other allies, because they will also have some influence on the final decision, that we should be included in the Nuclear Sharing programme?

I believe the discussion about Nuclear Sharing has to primarily apply to the three most important stages.

Firstly, we first need to get matters in order at home and decide that we want to participate in this.

This means that this consent is not only to be of an expert, professional nature, discussed at staff level, where it should be precisely analysed. If such a recommendation is made – and today there seems to be a conviction that we should join this programme – then the second step needs to be taken – namely political and national.

Meaning?

Agreement on a position on this matter between all political powers in Poland. It cannot be that different political centres have different opinions on this.

Such decisions should be discussed and agreed upon in advance, if only, for example at a meeting of the National Security Bureau, even if it’s to be a secret meeting. All political powers should arrive at a consensus on this at such a meeting. They need to agree that joining this programme is in Poland’s national interest and it should make efforts for this to happen. We can only approach the U.S. with a single position and negotiate with it after such a decision is made.

Whether the U.S. agrees to this is a different matter. If it does, how to implement it will only be a matter of planning this within NATO.

There has to be a certain logic in our aspirations, both in terms of the conduct and the way in which we enter the Nuclear Sharing programme, as well as the subsequent implementation of its related procedures.

Some analysts suggest that the best and fastest way for Europe to obtain nuclear weapons would be for the countries of the European Union to buy nuclear warheads from the U.S. We would simultaneously become even more financially connected with the U.S., and the U.S. is not indifferent to good business.

That’s impossible. That concept is out of the question for a fundamental reason. The Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits nuclear states from making them available to anyone.

Legally, the U.S. cannot provide nuclear weapons to other countries. In this context, it should be emphasized that this concept is often confused by claiming that the Nuclear Sharing programme means that the U.S. is providing nuclear weapons to countries, which provide planes or other platforms for carrying them.

No. It’s a U.S. weapon all the time; it’s a weapon that is subject to a U.S. decision. Even if a German or Dutch pilot is flying with such a bomb, that pilot is in the U.S. command system. This is not a German or Dutch bomb, even though pilots from these countries would be flying with such a bomb on their planes.

This would also apply to us if we were to enter this programme. We could only participate in it in precisely such a capacity.

Furthermore, nuclear weapons are such a strategic resource that sharing them, even with an ally, is not at all beneficial for their possessor.

That’s why I don’t assume it will be possible to buy such weapons from the U.S. If anything, we would need to try to produce them ourselves. Just like North Korea did, or like the Iranians are doing. There are also countries in Europe which have huge economies and technological capabilities to try to create their own nuclear weapons. But we should remember that this is related to a political and legal dilemma. If other countries try to obtain nuclear weapons, this would be in conflict with the treaty I mentioned. That’s why the spotlight is on Iran, while Israel is not officially admitting that it has such weapons, even though everyone knows that it has them.

So can’t we count on the French, for example, who have such weapons, making them available to other European countries in the event of a conflict?

Certainly not to us. Just like the U.S. or the UK, which are not making their nuclear arsenals available to anyone. However, the French can use nuclear weapons themselves to defend their ally. The UK or the U.S., which have a nuclear arsenal in Europe to defend their allies, can also do this. The French are also suggesting that their arsenal could be included in allied defence.

This is a positive signal, because we should remember that France once left the military structures of the alliance, but then returned to it. However, French nuclear weapons are still not considered within a common system of use of nuclear weapons within NATO.

France has not offered its nuclear weapons to the alliance’s common nuclear policy to date. Unlike the U.S., which makes its tactical nuclear weapons available for use within NATO’s common nuclear policy.

The U.S. is officially saying it can use such weapons to defend its allies, but France is not.

We can currently see a significant evolution of the French strategy and their approach to European security in the sense that they are pointing out the possibility of using their nuclear weapons in allied defence. This must be used so as to include France with its nuclear arsenal in the common allied defence system. This is important not so much in the sense of using these weapons in wartime, because, as we know, no one wants that. This is important as a deterrent of a potential enemy.

If, in this context, the French potential were to be included in this programme, nuclear deterrence in the defence of Europe would be significantly increased.

Nuclear weapons have so far proved themselves in the sense that they have been confirming their deterrent power for years, and no one has dared use them since World War II. And this should be the best, optimistic conclusion to these considerations.

Nuclear weapons are not meant to be used. They are meant to prevent war. What we are seeing now is a strategic nuclear game intended to serve the purpose of mutual deterrence.

Professor Stanisław Koziej

retired Brigadier General of the Polish Armed Forces

Member of the Forecasting Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He was a deputy minister of national defence in 2005–2006. In 2010–2015, he was secretary of state in the Chancellery of the President, head of the Presidential National Security Office and member of the Security Council.