The situation in Ukraine is difficult. We are helping Ukraine as much as we can, but it can be seen that some Western European countries that do not have direct contact with Russia are less concerned about Russia’s possible aggression against NATO than the influx of immigrants.

 General Leon Komornicki: A dangerous war is being fought beyond the eastern border of our country. We are a country on NATO’s eastern flank. That’s why we have a different view of this war than our other allies and our problems with security differ from theirs.

However, there is still no reflection in Poland on how much work we currently have ahead of us with regard to security.

Which of the challenges that await us are priorities for us?

The ability of the troops to perform their tasks in wartime is most important. The key to this, as Ukraine has shown, is ammunition. We are still producing an insufficient volume of this. That’s why we should start up investments in the construction of ammunition factories as soon as possible. Not one, but several, away from the centre, located close to the western border. Without ammunition we are defenceless.

As the armed forces develop and new weapons are purchased, we will need a huge amount of ammunition. The army should receive it primarily from our domestic industry.

If we are left at the mercy of imports from other countries, it could happen, as can currently be seen in Ukraine, that the army has to wait for ammunition, whereas the ammunition should be waiting for the soldiers so that they can use it when they need it. So the main problem is ammunition.

It has to be in warehouses in Poland, but also a certain amount should be located in one of the Western countries with which we border, so that, if difficulties arise with ammunition in Poland, we can secure the continuity of our army’s operations, because our capabilities could be destroyed as a result of mass attacks.

That country would play the same role as we are playing with respect to Ukraine. During wartime, imports of ammunition from Korea or the United States would take months. Of course, such an investment requires money, but this needs to be thought out in advance and preparations for such state security tasks should be made in peacetime.

Another thing is people. Defence education must be reinstated, including for politicians. The method of educating officers and training soldiers also needs to be changed and compulsory national service in the armed forces should be reintroduced. We cannot do much without people who understand the essence of state security.

Young people won’t like that. A large proportion of them object to the introduction of compulsory national service.

There is no other way of increasing the size of the army to several hundred thousand. This is also an element of building defence awareness among the population. It cannot be that the army will fight and civilians will sit in front of the television and “cheer on” the soldiers fighting for Białystok.

No, we all have to start defending ourselves immediately, everyone in his own position. And everyone has to know what to do. Without the foundation of preparing the public for general defence, and without reserves, the Polish army will be weak.

This cannot be achieved without withdrawing the suspension of national service. All the solutions to date, such as voluntary military service, are auxiliary measures.

National service has to be reinstated, there is no alternative. The sooner we do this, the better. Otherwise, we will be working towards weakening Poland’s defence. This is imperative for young people not to be sent out in combat gear, but for building a military training system.

Importantly, the system cannot work in such a way that someone with an electronics degree goes to work as a cook, and someone with catering education is sent to serve in the anti-aircraft corps.

A young man has to be sure that military service is not a waste of time for him, but an important stage in his life and his professional development, giving him the new values, knowledge and experience that are needed not only in the army.

This should also be a system that is consistent with the public defence education programme. At all levels of social education, from primary school to secondary school and university. We need to reinstate military education, cadet colleges and officer staff.

Is that so important?

Yes, because without people who think properly, who are prepared and who understand the essence of state defence, without building education – including of politicians – as part of the state defence education system, we will not be able to create a state defence system.

Politicians should not hold managerial positions in ministries; departmental directors and heads of security offices should not be in their positions if they are not educated on the most important issues of state security.

A special programme should be developed at the War Studies University; defence courses should be prepared for politicians, giving them a broader view of defence issues not only from the point of view of their own office, but also from the point of view of the need to defend the country and the participation of all ministries in the country’s defence.

We need to eliminate thinking about ministerial Poland and ministerial interests in the context of state defence once and for all. What we do in defence, in the defence industry, should translate into the economic development of the country and, simultaneously, the development of its defence mechanisms.

We talk about the need for changes in many areas of defence, but, after all, we have the support of our NATO allies behind us. We can always count on their help if necessary. The U.S. president is announcing that he will defend every inch of NATO territory.

I am far from not believing that this will be the case, but I am also far from uncritically accepting all declarations of this type. This is because they have to go hand in hand with action, as well as the ability and readiness of the European NATO armies to take immediate action.

Consequently, I wouldn’t get excited about Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack against one party is treated as an attack against the whole alliance, but the third article, which requires allied countries to develop their own adequate defence potential, which will contribute to NATO’s defence capabilities.

If we look at the European armies, none of them have adequate capabilities to oppose the Russian army. They don’t have that potential. They have been disarming themselves in practice over the years and many of them are still lacking greater reflection on how to change that.

Furthermore, Europe is struggling with a demographic problem. Another problem is the awareness of the European populations – and this also applies to our population – that personal involvement in the country’s defence activities is not assumed.

This is largely caused by the lack of defence education, the abandonment of conscripted armies, but also the lack of the country’s civil defence. This has to change. This has to be clearly stated in the new Act on Civil Defence. The construction of a system of general state defence is today one of the state’s most important duties.

Many factors influence the readiness of a state to defend itself. It’s not only the army, but also the country’s economic potential, its human resources and its alliances. If this is lacking, and today Western industry is not even able to satisfy the needs of the Ukrainian army, it means that this potential is missing.

The army in Poland is also still being built. This will last at least until the end of the decade. Which of the challenges here are of particular importance?

Indeed, European countries, even the largest ones like Germany, France and Great Britain, do not have a sufficient deterrent force today. They are only slowly building this capacity, which is not without its problems. This is also true of Poland, which is also building such capacity.

The most important thing is to build them in such a way as to discourage Russia from aggression, knowing that the border with Poland is to be the final strategic frontier enabling any possible Russian aggression to be stopped. The Polish border is the final frontier that the Russian army can reach. Russia must not take a single step onto our territory.

We have come to the question of whether the state’s defence is to be offensive or defensive?

Never defensive. We cannot focus exclusively on the defence between the Bug and Vistula. We have to defend ourselves in the aggressor’s territory.

This is active defence. In the event of a clear surprise, we should be ready for a pre-emptive strike against the enemy forces gathered within their territory for the purpose of attacking us. And the Russians have to be aware of this.

Should we have and demonstrate such capabilities so that the Russians know that we are ready to immediately respond to any threat?

Yes. Together with this, we have to develop specific capabilities, such as medium and short-range air defence programmes built within the Wisła and Narew programmes. This cannot be two batteries protecting Warsaw so that the gentlemen can feel good drinking coffee while the rest of the country is exposed to being bombarded with Russian missiles.

We should have at least 24 Patriot systems to defend the most important military facilities, critical infrastructure and cities, because there is no difference in modern warfare between the front and the rear. It can be seen in Ukraine that fighting at the rear can be even greater and more painful than that at the front.

Poland, which borders with Russia, a potential aggressor, must have the capability to take anti-surprise action. We have to be able to resist unexpected aggression. Therefore, efforts have to be made to build sufficient state defence potential independently of NATO and the European Union, which would enable us to use our capabilities and resources to the maximum possible extent.

After all, any attack on Poland would mean war with NATO. Why would they want to attack us?

For example, they may want to take over a passage in Suwałki and then hold peace talks under the threat of nuclear blackmail.

Let us touch on another problem, namely combat training of troops. Who is responsible for this today?

This is, after all, military production, the most important matter in brigades, regiments, battalions and independent divisions. There is no single commander who is responsible for training.

Combat training is conducted in platoons and companies. There cannot be a shortage of ammunition for training, trainers and other equipment. There may be shortages in the General Staff of the Polish Army – the general might not be driven around in a car or he may have a poorer mobile phone – but not in the subunits. So how is the budget divided now? From top to bottom.

When it gets down to the brigade, no money is left there. For training not only soldiers, but also staffs. When did the brigades or divisions last have exercises in our army, which involved the coordination of all combat systems?

You don’t win with Article 5, but with real combat capabilities and deterrence power, which is why alliances are just a further pillar of state defence. However, to a large extent, they do not depend only on us.

One of Poland’s important tasks today in this area should be the negotiation of our admission into the Nuclear Sharing programme and an increase in the number of allied troops stationed in our country. At least one heavy U.S. division should be stationed in Poland.

Training of the troops is probably another important pillar of our strategy, and things are not great here either. For example, there have recently been several tragic accidents on training grounds.

Have brigade exercises with support, collection of ammunition and marches been held in the last 5 years, for example from Drawsko to Orzysz or from Orzysz to the training ground in Nowa Dęba? There haven’t been any such exercises. Do we want to learn this as late as in wartime?

We still don’t have a new political/defence doctrine or a new Polish National Security Strategy. Our economy is also not ready for satisfying the needs of a war.

Because the doctrine is not treated as a priority by the politicians. After all, it is easier to present a few general provisions, just in case. Why is the doctrine so important?

Because if we wrongly identify the threats and incorrectly formulate the national security doctrine or strategy, this structure, which is the construction of Poland’s security will be inadequate, ineffective and weak. It will fall apart if a threat appears, and will prove to be a waste of enormous intellectual, financial and public effort because it will not satisfy the needs.

But another thing related to this is the development of the national scientific and research potential. It cannot be that Polish institutes do not cooperate with Ukraine, do not consult them on which weapon systems have proved to be best and do not conduct development research on the modernization of weapons, such as tanks or drones, taking advantage of the Ukrainian experience.

So what should the target potential of the Polish army be?

As our discussion clearly shows – the potential of the army must primarily be supported by sufficient resources of ammunition and weapons. And, as I have already emphasized, primarily appropriate human resources. As we once calculated, the Polish army should have at least 900,000 reservists.

The reservists should be trained and equipped. It cannot be that, in the event of a threat we will only start to train 60-year-old men, give them Kalashnikovs and a slice of bread and tell them to go and fight. A real reserve training system needs to be created.

This is still not there, although attempts are being made to develop this system.

The Polish army has neglected training reservists for years. An army without such support as personnel reserves weakens the structure of state defence. Even hundreds of tanks mean little without people, without reserves.

This is a huge amount of difficult, but important work that needs to be done and will pay off. Previously, there was always “someone” standing in the way of implementing important plans. That “someone” was not personally responsible for political and military decisions, but always managed to effectively interfere.  It will be very important to finally change this.

And finally, when performing all these tasks, we always have to remember that the most important foundation of the state’s defence system is the population. Its awareness, will and readiness to defend the homeland, support the army and identify with the army. If the public is psychologically and morally prepared for this task, this will be a strong deterrent. Without this, the national defence system will never be complete or universal.

Leon Stanisław Komornicki

retired major general of the Polish Army

In 1992–1997, he was the head of the Training Inspectorate, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army. A member of the Economic Shadow Cabinet of Business Center Club, vice-president of the management board of the Euro-Atlantic Association.