An innovative mathematical model was used in the previous articles on the military strength of countries in various regions of the world, including such analyses as The world’s armies – what is the actual potential and realistic military effectiveness of individual countries, Armies of Europe – what is the real military potential of Ukrainian and Russian troops and other armies of European countries, Middle Eastern Armies – the actual military potential of individual armies of this region, to assess military potential, which was developed and which describes the armed forces of individual countries of the world.

This model is based on the market principle – each army is worth as much as the money allocated to it. Of course, allocated effectively, after deducting the amounts wasted and embezzled. What remains builds the strength of the given army.

Naturally, strength alone is not everything. Operational capability – the ability to use this strength away from its bases – is also important. In this model, operational capability is measured by dividing strength by the number of soldiers in service.

The last parameter of the model is effort – namely, the extent to which a given country finances its army with respect to its actual capabilities. This means the level of military spending calculated as a percentage of the country’s total output, referred to as gross domestic product or GDP.

The components of the model are therefore quantity, quality and cost. This model was described in detail on the NationalSecurity website in the first article of the series.

This model, which contains just three parameters, surprisingly accurately described the armed conflicts actually taking place around the world, both those currently taking place and those from the recent past. Its predictions prove to be highly consistent with the results of the measurements, so it can be used to predict the probability of the outbreak and the course of wars that are yet to come.

Enter the dragon?

China has grown into a global power, but this is due rather to its size, and not to the actual productivity of its economy. It is still a much poorer country, not only than the USA or neighbouring Japan. Chinese GDP per capita is also about half of … Poland’s. Even greater differences can be seen when comparing the efficiency of the economies measured by GDP per hour worked. The efficiency of the Chinese economy was $18 per man-hour in 2023, whereas it was $53 in Poland, and as much as $87 in the U.S.

Therefore, despite its impressive development, China has not become a developed country. It is still a primitive, corrupt and inefficient communist dictatorship, just as it was in 1980. If not for its size, it would not have a greater role in the world than Macedonia or Peru. It can be said that China is not actually a developed country at present, but if the rapid growth from the last four decades continues there, it will eventually become a developed country. Unfortunately, the key word in this sentence is ‘if’. This is because all the signs suggest that – like every communist country before it – the People’s Republic of China has already exhausted its simple growth reserves and is entering a period of economic stagnation, also referred to as the middle-income trap.

After all, the theory predicts that every country in which an industrial revolution has already taken place will eventually enter into a period of stagnation. Of the countries in this region, Japan, for instance, has already found itself in this situation. However, the key factor is the level of GDP per capita at which this trap can be found. Economic stagnation at $50,000 per capita, as in Japan, is one thing, while at $20,000 per capita, as in China, is something completely different. The clash between aroused consumer aspirations and actual average income, which is unlikely to grow any more, can be very painful.

Like any dictatorship, despite the appearances it tries to portray, the regime ruling the People’s Republic of China is very fragile. Legal authorities can effectively rule with around 30% of the population supporting them.  This trap is much higher for dictatorships. So far, the support for the Chinese authorities has arisen precisely from the rapid growth of prosperity. As long as the piece of the pie available to the average inhabitant was continuously increasing, the citizens did not raise any objections to the authorities. But it has just stopped growing, still remaining low compared to the civilized countries. In such a situation, social frustration grows rapidly, while the regime has to urgently seek new support.

The temptation to distract the nation from its permanent and lasting poverty by tightening foreign policy, up to and including starting a ‘short victorious war’, invariably eventually shows up in every dictatorship as the living conditions in the country it governs deteriorate.

The most typical policy of this type is currently being pursued by Russia, even though it reached its middle-income trap a long time ago, around the first decade of the 21st century. There is no wonder that Russia has been constantly invading someone militarily since then.

Of course, it is also possible to come out of the middle-income trap and continue developing economically, but that would require changing the political system to a free-market system governed by the rule of law. However, the dictatorship loses its power very quickly in such a system, because not only is it no longer necessary, but it actually obstructs people from increasing their affluence. That is why dictatorships very rarely resort to this solution. They far prefer militarization. The regime of the People’s Republic of China started to operate in this way, even despite national traditions, which, unlike in Japan or Europe, for example, attribute a rather low social status to warriors in China.

The aggression of the Beijing regime, which, for now, is still just verbal, was directed – slightly differently than in the case of Russia – in one, precisely defined direction.

Two faces of the Middle Kingdom

The Chinese themselves most frequently call their country Zhōngguó, which literally means the Middle Kingdom. However, this analysis uses two names for the Middle Kingdom – ‘China’ and ‘the People’s Republic of China’. These notions are not fully synonymous. This is because there are actually two Chinese states.

The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 as a result of a civil war in which the communists defeated the then legal Chinese government. The defeated Chinese authorities then took shelter on the island of Taiwan located off the Chinese coast, which similarly remained independent of the communist authorities in Beijing. This state of affairs has persisted to this day. And although few people officially recognize Taiwan’s independence today, it is an incredibly developed and civilized country, one of the richest in the world, with a highly modern economy. A country that has already overtaken Japan in terms of its level of development.

The contrast between Taiwan and the ‘People’s’ China is comparable to the contrast between Israel and its surrounding Muslim countries. In both cases, these are modern, free-market, affluent and civilized societies governed by the rule of law, directly neighbouring with primitive, backward, corrupt, miserable and brutal regimes, but ruling over a much larger population.

Therefore, there is little wonder that, as economic growth slows, the authorities of the People’s Republic of China speak increasingly strongly about Taiwan, threatening it and announcing the true entry of the dragon. ‘Unification’ under its rule, even by force.

Paradoxically, the People’s Republic of China itself has closed the window of opportunity to absorb Taiwan peacefully. Just two decades ago, many Taiwanese people were seriously considering such an option. The economy of the ‘People’s’ China was growing rapidly then, and its authorities had a much more conciliatory attitude. When taking over Hong Kong, Britain’s former enclave in China, in 1997, a country, like Taiwan, that was inhabited by Chinese people, and was simultaneously highly developed, civilized and affluent, the authorities in Beijing promised not to disturb the free market system prevailing in Hong Kong, that was giving it wealth, which was referred to as the policy of ‘one country, two systems’. However, the regime of the ‘People’s’ China did not have the patience to tolerate this strange island of the free market, the rule of law and private property, and did not hesitate to slaughter the goose that was laying the golden eggs, depriving Hong Kong of its actual autonomy, of which only a dummy version remains to this day.

The unsuccessful experiment with Hong Kong certainly dispelled the illusions of the Taiwanese people about peaceful unification, while only the escalation of an aggressive policy remained for the authorities of the ‘People’s’ China.

Apprehensions and statistics

The threats made by China are taken very seriously around the world, and the media are constantly announcing that an allegedly inevitable military confrontation might take place in this region at any time. And although I believe differently, it does not mean that my scepticism and apprehensions are justified, because I also thought that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was unlikely, and yet it took place.

In order to check whether apprehensions or hard statistical data are more important, let us move from a qualitative to a quantitative description and therefore, to do this, let’s start up our mathematical model of armed forces for the countries of the broadly understood Far East.

Here, we are using data collected by the SIPRI institute from Stockholm, which unfortunately has some gaps. The lack of information about the communist army of North Korea is particularly troublesome. A very large army, but – as it can be assumed from the terrible poverty of that country – with negligible operational capability, and probably also with little strength. Worse still, we also have no information about the Vietnamese army, which is famous for defeating the French troops, and later even the American troops. However, ignoring these shortcomings, the armies of the Far Eastern countries are presented in Chart 1. The horizontal axis presents operational capability, while the vertical axis presents effort. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the strength of the individual armies. This strength is also presented numerically as the total amount in millions of U.S. dollars that was effectively spent on these armies over the last twelve years, after taking into account the level of corruption.

Chart 1. Effort and operational capability of the armies of the Far East

Source: own analysis based on data from the SIPRI Institute in Stockholm.

At first glance, the situation looks ominous for Taiwan. The Chinese circle completely overwhelms the tiny Taiwanese circle with its size. After all, the Chinese army is the second strongest army in the world. It is more than ten times stronger than the Taiwanese army. In the event of war, the ‘People’s’ China can simply overwhelm ‘Taiwanese’ China with their caps. Theoretically, therefore, the conquest of Taiwan should not pose any problems.

However, there is just one ‘but’. The proportions of the Russian and Ukrainian forces were very similar in 2021. This is probably what convinced Putin that his invasion of Ukraine would be the short, victorious war that the despots wanted, namely a three-day special operation. But the Moscow dictator did not take into account the second parameter of the model – manoeuvrability. The army’s ability to operate a long way from its bases.

The operational capability of the Russian army was and is very low and has never been able to effectively redirect a sufficiently large proportion of its forces to Ukraine. Since the distances involved can be as much as a thousand kilometres, it was clear that the Russian attack would inevitably be bogged down, at most, along a line that is further west, even if the Ukrainian forces had not put up any resistance. However, Putin started a war that he had no chance of winning. Of course, the Ukrainian army also has little manoeuvrability, comparable to that of the Russian army, and cannot conduct invasions far outside its borders, but it is perfectly capable of defending its borders, which the Ukrainians are bravely doing.

Our chart shows that the analogy between Russia and Ukraine, and the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, goes deeper than just proportions in military strength. Both of these armies are only slightly more manoeuvrable than the Russian army, which is also illustrated in the chart.

In the case of the Taiwanese army, the situation is clear and, in this respect, it resembles the Israeli army. It is a civic army, which has the task of directly defending its own homes. It does not intend to attack anyone; it does not plan military intervention outside its borders, so it does not need a high degree of manoeuvrability. The situation is different in the case of the army of ‘People’s’ China, which is not really threatened by an armed attack from anyone. It is too large to defend the country, and it is decidedly insufficiently manoeuvrable for a possible invasion, and certainly an overseas invasion.

Of course, the argument can be raised that Taiwan is over 16 times smaller than Ukraine. The invader’s low level of manoeuvrability should not be such an obstacle. Fortunately, Taiwan also differs from Ukraine in other ways.

The first is obvious and has already been mentioned. Taiwan is an island, separated from the mainland by a sea that is over 120 kilometres wide, even at its narrowest point. Crossing it requires not only a successful sea or air landing, but also a constant supply of reinforcements and supplies to the landing troops, all under fire from the island’s defenders. This requires an extremely high level of manoeuvrability, and only a few armies in the world can attempt to successfully conduct such an operation. The Chinese army is certainly not one of them.

The second, even more significant difference is the level of civilization. Ukraine, which, until recently, was part of the Russian ‘mir’, was very similar to Russia. Just as backward, primitive, corrupt and, lacking Russia’s vast resources of raw materials, even poorer than Russia. Its involvement in the world economy was therefore modest. In proportion to its low level of significance in world trade, the willingness of developed countries, which depend on this trade, to help was also not particularly great. There was no talk at all about allies shooting down Russian missiles targeting Ukrainian cities. Israel’s situation was completely different, as it is a much more developed and civilized country than Ukraine.

In this respect, Taiwan is more like Israel. One of the most affluent countries in the world has many powerful allies with strong economic ties to it, who will rush to its aid in the event of a Chinese invasion. Global allies, especially the U.S., as well as local allies that can be found on the chart. These are countries that also feel threatened by China’s expansion and which also receive their share of threats from Beijing – albeit much smaller than in the case of Taiwan.

Distribution of power in the East Asia and Pacific region

Of course, willingness does not always mean ability. For example, the Philippine army is very weak and not very manoeuvrable. In case of war, the Philippines will only be able to provide their airspace and territorial waters to the allies defending Taiwan, but even this will constitute a great deal of support from this poor and weak country.

However, South Korea has a very strong army in this region, a developed and civilized country, like Taiwan, and much larger than Taiwan. Unfortunately, like the Taiwanese army, it is a kind of popular movement with relatively low manoeuvrability, optimized to defend the country against a possible invasion from communist North Korea. If anything were to happen, it would not be able to send Taiwan any more than symbolic support, especially if, at the same time as the ‘unification’ operation, the authorities of the ‘People’s’ China order North Korea to conduct appropriate armed demonstrations with the intention of tying down the South Korean forces.

Japan will almost certainly become more involved. Although, paradoxically, its constitution prohibits it from having armed forces, it actually has a very strong army, which is considerably manoeuvrable, although that it is not officially called an ‘army’. Japan is also close to Taiwan, closer even than the closest point of China.

Although Japan’s aid for Taiwan is already really large and quantifiable, it will have one political downside. Historical events will mean that it will be used by the propaganda of the ‘People’s’ China in a smear campaign against Taiwan’s defenders, similarly to how Moscow’s propaganda is currently attacking German aid for Ukraine. Albeit not very effectively.

The next two countries with increasing operational capability that Taiwan could count on are New Zealand and Singapore. While they already have high operational capability, their strength is relatively low, although certainly noticeable.

Finally, there is Australia, with an army that is comparable in strength to South Korea, but with much greater operational capability.

In summary, only Taiwan itself, with the variety of military, political and economic support from the above countries, would be able to easily defend itself against aggression from the ‘People’s’ China.  But after all, the chart only includes countries that are geographically located in the western Pacific. It does not include countries located outside this area, but with significant interests there. Countries such as Great Britain, France and Canada have military forces that are both powerful and have a high level of operational capability, and also have a vested interest in Taiwan remaining free.

Finally, although China has the second strongest army in the world, albeit not having the greatest operational capability, there is a huge gap between it and the world’s first army. The military strength of the U.S. is equal to all other armed forces in the world combined, and is six times greater than that of China. The U.S. military also has the greatest operational capability in the world. Meanwhile, Taiwan is crucial for the U.S., its economy and its global influence. There is no way the U.S. would allow it to be attacked. It will certainly intervene.

A potential coalition defending Taiwan is therefore much stronger militarily than China, as well as economically, and is vastly superior in terms of operational capability. Any attempts to land on Taiwan would therefore end in a disaster of truly epic proportions for the Chinese ‘People’s’ forces, in comparison with which even Russia’s achievements in Ukraine would appear to be a monumental victory.

Will logic prevail over governments?

Logically, it can therefore be forecast that Taiwan will not be attacked. However, in the case of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, rational logic pointed to precisely the same conclusion, whereas the attack did take place. Putin turned out to be irrational and it cannot be ruled out that the same will happen with China’s leader, Xi Jinping.

Fortunately, we have one more parameter – effort. Spending on the military sector calculated as a percentage of GDP. In Putin’s Russia, for a country preparing for conquest, at least in comparison with Central Europe, this indicator was relatively low, even though it was still more than 4% of GDP.

However, China’s effort is defined as completely peaceful and amounts to less than 2% of GDP. So the ‘People’s’ China is not preparing for any war over Taiwan, and all the more so it is not realistically preparing against such a powerful coalition. After all, the same applies to Taiwan. Its government, which is much better organized and more competent than the Chinese government, does not believe in an invasion from the mainland either.

Taiwan’s effort is also low and amounts to just 1.9% of GDP. If the threat were real, this indicator would be at least twice as high.

If the PRC’s regime, despite the lack of any preparations for it, were to try to invade, this would mean that it would be even more stupid than Putin’s regime, and that would be really very hard to believe. Such a war may be short, but it will certainly not be victorious.

Potential regarding operational capability

Let us also draw attention to the matter of operational capability, namely the quality of the armed forces. The idea that the state of the armed forces is a simple reflection of the state of the whole country is repeated throughout the whole series of articles. So far, this was a claim made somewhat on faith; now we will try to justify it a little better.

In the article on Europe Armies of Europe – what is the real military potential of Ukrainian and Russian troops and other armies of European countries, where there was a relatively large number of armies to compare, it could be noted that the value of this parameter is statistically significantly inversely proportionally to the level of corruption specified by the CPI – Corruption Perception Index.

The better and more competently a country is managed, the better and more efficient are its institutions, the less corrupt it is and the more operational its army is, and this is completely independent of the other parameters. Armies can be strong or weak, the military effort can be high – if the international situation is tense – or low, but, on average, the army of a better-governed country, even if it is weak, has high operational capability, while the army of a corrupt country with incompetent authorities, even if it is very strong, has low operational capability. The only countries that break this trend are the civilized countries, which are directly threatened by invasions of far more primitive but powerful enemies and where the soldiers have to directly defend their own homes. In the Middle East, such a developed country, with an army of low operational capability, is Israel. In the Far East, where the same relationship also applies, such countries are Taiwan and South Korea, which are below the trend line in Chart 2.

Chart 2. Far East – relationship between operational capability and the level of corruption

Chart 2. Far East – relationship between operational capability and the level of corruption

Source: own analysis based on data from the SIPRI Institute in Stockholm.

However, Russia and the People’s Republic of China are corrupt countries (Russia more so), as well as being backward, primitive and ruled by incompetent dictatorships. That is why their armies also have low operational capability, while the dreams of extensive conquests, ‘spheres of influence’ and a ‘multipolar world’ that Putin and Xi have will remain purely in their dreams forever.

There is a power law relationship between the level of corruption and operational capability, with an exponent of the order of 3. Even a small reduction in corruption translates into a significant increase in operational capability. And of course vice versa.

A lesson for Poland?

This is also a lesson for Poland, where the level of corruption measured by CPI increased substantially in the years 2015–2023. Outlay on the Polish army also increased completely disproportionately to the increase in risk. Unfortunately, the increase in corruption meant that this was not rational spending. The government at the time – sometimes making poorly considered purchases, without a tender and ‘outside all procedures’ – was more interested in the domestic propaganda effect than in the actual situation of the Polish army and, after all, no one would be surprised if it turned out that they were also interested in corruption rent. However, even worse than corruption was their incompetence. The authorities themselves repeatedly declared directly that they do not want Poland to have an army with a high level of operational capability, which is perfectly equipped and armed, composed of highly competent and excellently trained and therefore appropriately paid, specialists. No, the Polish army was to be built on the basis of the model of the Russian army, or, to use a less drastic comparison, the Ukrainian army. Large in numbers, but not very mobile, capable only of static defence.

This is a mistake. The Ukrainian war has already demonstrated that such an army is not worth much. Of course, it is effectively defending itself against an enemy that is similar to it, but at the cost of the destruction and losses that its country is suffering during a long-term conflict.

Simultaneously, Poland’s military spending is dangerously approaching the 5% GDP threshold, above which it will start to have a visible and negative impact on the economy. More important than further increases is now its rational spending on specific priority goals and a reduction in the level of corruption, at least to the level from before 2015. This will enable it to simultaneously increase its strength and operational capability, even with less effort than at present. This is necessary not only for effectively defending against a direct threat from Russia, but primarily for effective support from the allies and the problem-free increase of Polish contingents, should such a need arise, in the Baltic States, Finland, or even Ukraine, once it becomes a member of NATO.